

AVIATION SECURITY UPDATE

What this paper is about

To update delegates on developments in the UK on airport security issues including:

- Full Body Scanners – para 4
- Sniffer Dogs – para 19
- Explosive Trace Detection Equipment – para 21
- Passenger Profiling – para 23
- Commons Home Affairs Committee Report – para 25
- Review of Airport Policing and the Policing and Crime Act – para 28
- Foreign Nationals and Criminal Records Checks – para 32
- UK Identity Cards – para 36
- E-Borders – para 39
- Laptop Computers – para 50
- Lifting the Restrictions on Liquids – para 53
- Charges for Security Services – para 57
- Common Rules across Europe – para 61

Points for Discussion

- Paras 4/18 – *Full Body Scanners*: Members may like to consider whether to make representations in response to the previous Government's draft Code of Practice
- Paras 25/27 – *Commons Home Affairs Committee Report*: Whether to comment to the Department on any of the Committee's Findings or Recommendations
- Paras 34/49 – *E-Borders*: The meeting may like to express its concern about the apparent disarray which seems to have developed around the scheme
- Paras 57/60 – *Charges for Security Services*: The meeting may wish to hear from delegates about the charges being made for security services at UK airports

Points for Possible Action

The meeting will wish to decide whether to submit any representations in respect of the various matters listed above as points for discussion

Introduction

1. Unfortunately the year has been marked by a big upsurge in security concerns at airports in response to the attempted attack on Northwest flight 253 to Detroit on Christmas Day 2009. This follows the security alerts which occurred at Heathrow on 10th August 2006 and at Glasgow on 30th June 2007 and airport security continues to be a major pre-occupation at airports across the world.
2. The attack at Detroit resulted in the introduction of the first body scanners in the UK, the introduction by the end of the year of explosive trace detection equipment, more passengers being searched by hand and more sniffer dogs. And passengers bound for the US are subject to extra security checks prior to boarding.
3. The result of the extra checks was an increase in the delays suffered by passengers. In an effort to speed up the security process most airports have increased the number of security staff. Some are seeking to improve passenger throughput by using new technology and improved processes – an example of this is automated tray handling system at Gatwick – while others are introducing more passenger search facilities in order to cope with the extra security requirements. At this year's host airport (London City) for example two new security check-in lanes were brought into use on 27th February bringing the total number of search lanes to six. To do this the airport brought forward elements of a £7m scheme already planned to re-order the airport terminal and worked around the clock to build the new facility which was completed and operational in just 4 weeks. According to the airport's MD the new lanes increased passenger screening capacity by 50%. Sadly, though, the scheme resulted in the closure of landside catering facilities of long standing.

Full Body Scanners

4. Last year our report on Airport Security¹ included an item on full body scanners which had then been in use in the US for some time.
5. On 1st February last the previous Government announced the initial deployment of security scanners at Heathrow and Manchester airports. This was part of a package of measures announced as a direct response to the attempted attack on Northwest flight 253 to Detroit on Christmas Day 2009.
6. The previous Government said that the device used on that flight had clearly been constructed with the aim of making detection by existing screening methods extremely difficult. In making that announcement the previous Government published an interim code of practice but a commitment was given to consult on the interim Code of Practice with a view to producing a final Code to underpin a further rollout of security scanners across the UK. This would provide an opportunity to air concerns which had been expressed about privacy, health and safety, equality and data protection.
7. The code of practice is part of a Direction issued to aerodrome managers under the Aviation Security Act 1982 which requires security scanners to be deployed at specified airports. Where security scanners are required to be deployed, airport operators must ensure that the measures specified in the Code are adopted. The Direction also requires security scanners to be operated in accordance with detailed protocols which include security sensitive information on the operation of security scanners such as selection criteria for those to be scanned.
8. There are different types of body scanners but in general they emit radio waves over the body. A three dimensional image is created by measuring the heat reflected from the person. The body scanners can penetrate clothing and are designed to be an upgrade to the usual body "pat down". The scans do blur out faces but the image does reveal the naked body.
9. There are no full body scanners in use yet at airports other than Heathrow and Manchester but it looks likely that the scanners will be rolled out across UK airports

¹ <http://www.ukaccs.info/09almfiles/09security.pdf> - paras 23/34

throughout 2010. Their use at Heathrow and Manchester airports, and in the USA, has already given rise to considerable controversy in terms of privacy and civil rights and in relation to the legality of using them to scan children.

10. At the end of March the previous Government launched the promised consultation exercise in relation to a draft of the code of practice in its final form. Details were circulated to all members on 29th March 2010. The draft Code can be seen in the consultation document on the Department's website². There is a copy of the Executive Summary of the consultation document at Annex A1 to this paper. The closing date for comments is 21st June 2010.
11. In drawing up the code the previous Government said it had tried to address many of the concerns about the use of body scanners. For many people in society security scanners offer a less intrusive process than a hand search as there is no physical contact needed during the scanning process. The consultation paper says that the vast majority of people screened in previous trials have been content with the process. Indeed a survey widely reported in the press in April found that as many as 90 per cent of the public in the UK are happy to use the new full-body scanners at airports. The survey found that acceptance is far higher in Britain than in any of the 11 other countries covered by the survey of 10,000 people by the IT company Unisys. As many as one in three people in Germany and Belgium said they would object to the scans.
12. According to the code if a passenger is selected for security scanning, they will not be offered an alternative method of screening as they are in the US. Refusal to be screened will result in the passenger not being allowed to travel and it is reported that this has already happened at Manchester. Passengers must not be selected on a basis that may constitute discrimination such as ethnic origin, gender, age or race.
13. The Human Rights Act states that any infringement to the right of privacy must be necessary and proportionate. The previous Government said that security scanners were being deployed in the interests of protecting national security, public safety and the prevention and detection of crime and that this justifies the use of scanners. However, some believe that the fact that passengers are not being offered alternative search methods might be seen as an infringement of privacy.
14. The previous Government believed that if the data and privacy controls in the Code were fully and properly implemented the use of security scanners would comply with the Data Protection Act 1998.
15. As regards risks to health, the previous Government pointed to the results of an independent assessment of the risks from the effects of body scanners. The assessment, which compared the risk from body scanners to other everyday risks, found that the use of body scanners is a negligible risk to health from exposure to ionising radiation. But the draft Code requires the airport operator to ensure that all appropriate local risk assessments have been conducted for the type of body scanners being deployed and that the equipment conforms to all relevant health and safety requirements. It also requires that before the deployment of body scanners which produce ionising radiation a measure of the ambient radiation dosage and the effective dose that a passenger receives when being scanned must be conducted by qualified people.
16. In their March 2010 report on counter terrorism measure at British airports the Commons Home Affairs Committee of the House of Commons comment on the use of body scanners and a range of other matters – see paras 25-27 below.
17. Consultative Committees have been pondering whether to offer comments in response to the consultation document. Perhaps delegates would like to share the views emerging from local consideration of the of the draft code?
18. Meanwhile doubts have already been expressed about the efficacy of the scanners in the fight against terrorism. For example, it is understood that these machines only help in detecting explosives concealed *on* the body but not explosives concealed *in* the body.

² <http://www.dft.gov.uk/consultations/open/2010-23/>

The question arises whether the increased use of sniffer dogs would be more effective, as well as effective passenger profiling. These points were put to the previous Government and a copy of their reply is at Annex A2.

Sniffer Dogs

19. Among the measures announced by the previous Government following the attack at Detroit was the use of more sniffer dogs.
20. Specially trained dogs can be used to detect explosives using their noses which are very sensitive to scents. While very effective, their usefulness becomes degraded as a dog becomes tired or bored and it is said to be a very expensive option.

Explosive Trace Detection Equipment

21. Another measure announced by the previous Government was the introduction at all UK airports by the end of the year of explosive trace detection equipment.
22. Explosive detection, already in use many airports in the US, is a non-destructive inspection process to determine whether something in a passenger's luggage contains explosive material. Most explosives are not water soluble, and it is very hard to get rid of traces on the hands even after washing with water and soap. Explosive traces can be found on undisturbed objects even months after the actual explosive has been removed. Several types of machines have been developed to detect trace signatures for various explosive materials. The most common technology, as seen in US airports, is ion mobility spectrometry (IMS).

Passenger Profiling

23. The possibility of using targeted passenger profiling is also being examined. This would see certain travellers designated for more rigorous security checks before a flight. People behaving suspiciously or with an unusual travel pattern could be selected but racial or religious factors may also form part of the criteria and it is said that this might give rise to resentment. The idea is, therefore, controversial.
24. The BAA has already started training airport security staff in 'behavioural analysis techniques'. This is aimed at helping them to spot passengers acting unusually and target them for additional search.

Commons Home Affairs Committee Report

25. On 24th March 2010 the Home Affairs Committee of the House of Commons published its report *Counter Terrorism Measures at British Airports*. The report can be seen in full on Parliament's website³ but the Conclusions and Recommendations are attached to this paper at Annex B.
26. The key points are described in the report as:
 - A full-body scanner of the type being deployed in UK airports costs around £100,000.
 - While the introduction of body scanners is a welcome development in airport security, the Government should place greater emphasis on varying the security measures in place rather than relying on one make or model.
 - There is a danger that by adopting "proportionate measures" the Government adopts a too reactive stance on the issue of airport security.
 - The Government should mandate universal behavioural training for all airport security staff at UK airports.
 - The Government should be more willing to refuse direct flights from countries not meeting tougher international security standards and should provide more equipment and training to airports across the globe.

³ <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmhaff/311/311.pdf>

- Privacy concerns should not prevent the deployment of scanners; reports of such concerns are overstated.
 - “Transec” which is currently based in the Department for Transport should become the responsibility of the Home Office through the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism.
27. Members may wish to talk about some of the Committee’s findings and recommendations many of which seem to agree with opinions often heard among UKACCS members. It may be the meeting will want to offer comments or representations to the Department?

Review of Airport Policing

28. Members will recall that in November 2005 the previous Government announced it had commissioned an independent, wide-ranging review of policing at airports. The review aimed to identify a sustainable approach to airport policing which took account of the roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders in protecting an airport and in particular addressing the need for funding arrangements that are objective and transparent. These would replace the funding arrangements in section 25 of the Aviation Security Act 1982 which empowered the Secretary of State to designate airports for the purposes of policing. Such airports could be *obliged* to make a contribution towards the cost of airport policing. Nine airports were designated - Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted, Birmingham, Manchester, Prestwick, Edinburgh, Glasgow and Aberdeen. The Civil Aviation Act 2006 made provision for *Police Services Agreements* at designated airports to be entered into by the airport operator, the chief constable and the police authority. Last year we reported that such agreements had been entered into for the policing of Heathrow, Gatwick and Stansted airports.
29. The report of the 2005/2006 Review was submitted to the Department for Transport in July 2006. It recommended that the system of "designation" should be discontinued and that policing costs should generally be met by the industry on the basis that policing forms part of an agreed airport "community" response, that costs should be clear and transparent and that policing at airports should be brought within the mainstream policing agenda.
30. Measures to give effect to these recommendations were included in the *Policing and Crime Act 2009* which received the Royal Assent in November 2009. Among other things this Act establishes new arrangements for airport security on the lines recommended by the Review. The two main objectives are to:
- ensure that the majority of airports in the UK agree a local airport security plan with their key stakeholders, based upon an agreed multi-agency threat and risk analysis; and
 - ensure that, where it is agreed under the terms of an airport security plan that a dedicated policing presence is required at an airport, the airport operator will make payments in respect of the dedicated policing services provided.
31. The Act is being brought into force by stages by commencement order and the airport security provisions have yet to take effect.

Foreign Nationals – Criminal Records Checks

32. This has been a matter of concern to a number of consultative committees some of whom have been in correspondence with the Department for Transport (DFT) about it.
33. Members will recall that in a paper submitted to the last Annual Meeting at Belfast it was noted that on 11th February 2009 the Department for Transport had launched a consultation seeking views on proposals to implement overseas criminal record checks for certain transport posts. The consultation documents can still be seen in full on the Department’s website⁴. The closing date for comments was 29 May 2009.

⁴ <http://www.dft.gov.uk/consultations/closed/crc/>

34. In discussion members felt the DfT's proposals to introduce overseas criminal record checks were reasonably sensible but it was noted that the proposals would only apply to new members of staff. And it was also questioned whether the records held overseas would be accurate and comprehensive as those records held in the UK. Nonetheless the proposals were a positive step forward.
35. In July Ministers announced they had decided that there was clear support for the proposal to introduce overseas criminal record checks to new staff in posts subject to National Security Vetting (NSV) as set out in option 4 in the consultation. They would introduce this in stages and by mode of transport, starting with aviation where it would apply to staff appointed on or after 31 August 2009. As of that date all staff who enter a post which is subject to NSV, and who have had a period of continuous residency outside of the UK for 6 months or more within the immediately preceding 5 years, would be subject to a check of criminal record information in respect of each relevant country.

UK Identity Cards

36. Last year we reported that starting in the second half of 2009, the scheme for ID Cards would be extended to UK citizens with the first cards being issued to people working in specific sensitive roles or locations where verification of identity would enhance the protection of the public. The announcement said the first cards would be issued to those working airside in the country's airports. The first such cards would be issued at London City and Manchester Airports. This would be in the nature of a trial which, if successful, would lead on to the issue of ID cards to airside employees at other airports.
37. This focus on airports gave rise to a certain amount of consternation. The Heathrow Airport Consultative Committee had expressed its disquiet while BALPA, which represents British pilots, had written to Manchester and London City airports warning that pilots would not cooperate with the introduction of the ID cards.
38. In June 2009 the then Home Secretary, Alan Johnson, dropped the plan to make ID cards compulsory for pilots and airside workers at these two airports and the cards are now being issued on a voluntary basis. The new Government says it will scrap the ID card scheme along with the National Identity register, the next generation of biometric passports and the Contact Point Database - see section 10 on page 6 of the note⁵ issued on 11th May 2010 of the agreements reached by the two parties in the new Government in their coalition discussions. (Out of interest the author of this paper, the Secretary of the Consultative Committee at London City Airport, obtained an ID card under the scheme. This involved filling in a long form and an interview at the airport followed by a session for the taking of photographs and fingerprints. If any member would like to see the card do please ask.)

E-Borders

39. Last year we told members about the previous UK Government's 'e-borders' and 'border management' programmes which according to the previous Government amounted to a radical re-organisation of border and travel surveillance policy.
40. According to *United Kingdom Border Agency (UKBA)* the aim of the e-Borders programme is "to transform our border control to ensure greater security, effectiveness, and efficiency". To do this, they will make full use of the latest electronic technology to provide a way of collecting and analysing information on everyone who travels to or from the United Kingdom. Other technologies, particularly biometrics, will ensure UKBA identify people securely and effectively.
41. The operational hub of e-Borders is the *National Border Targeting Centre (NBTC)* at Manchester which replaced the smaller joint border operations unit at Heathrow. At the new Centre, multi-agency teams from UKBA, the police and *Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA)* work together to screen data on passengers and crew entering or leaving the country against watchlists to allow them to identify potential risks and issue alerts to frontline border officers and police and so help to create a more secure border.

⁵ <http://www.ukaccs.info/coalitionagreement120510.pdf>

42. UKBA is responsible for delivering the e-Borders programme with the support of the police and HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC). They are also, they say, working closely with the travel industry whose support is crucial to the programme's success.
43. The e-Borders programme has already delivered three pilot projects.
 - *Semaphore* has enabled UKBA to test the e-Borders programme, ensuring carriers provide information on selected routes, and providing border agencies with detailed information about passengers who are a potential risk.
 - The multi-agency *National Border Targeting Centre (NBTC)*. As mentioned above the NBTC collects and analyses passenger information and provides border agencies with an alert on which they can act. It is claimed that this has already led to significant operational successes.
 - The *Iris Recognition Immigration System (IRIS)* is a biometric entry system, which recognises the unique iris patterns of a person's eye to allow quick, automated entry for pre-registered passengers at selected ports in the United Kingdom. We reported on this system last year
44. According to a Sky News report circulated to all members in March e-Borders has to date checked 156 million passengers leading to over 5,400 arrests for crimes including rape, murder and violent assault against the person. The previous Government believed that the e-Borders scheme would monitor 95% of passenger movements by end of 2010.
45. As reported last year the previous Government planned to introduce the e-Borders scheme to counter terrorism and to combat crime. But many believed it would open the way for those with more sinister motives. In any event the shift from "targeting" suspected individuals to placing everyone's movements under surveillance raised all kinds of privacy and data protection issues. The previous Government presented the system as necessary for countering terrorism and serious organised crime but many thought it could very easily be extended to cover all crime or all suspected crime however minor. The scheme continues to be controversial. According to a press report circulated to all members in May 2010 the police last year investigated the travel habits, family, friends and backgrounds of 47,000 innocent people last year after they bought plane tickets to fly into and out of Britain. Checks included scrutiny of the police national computer, financial records and analysis of 'known associates' before people were cleared for travel. But it is understood the £1.2 billion system has never led to the arrest of a terrorist and that police now use it to target 'sex offenders and football hooligans'.
46. The scheme has run into other troubles. One of these surfaced when the previous Government announced that the same rules would apply to *all* international passengers, arriving by *all* carriers. This soon stirred up opposition in Europe not least among rail and ferry operators, ex-pats living in other EU countries and recreational sailors not many of whom were willing or able to give 24 hours notice of international travel. And the scheme also ran into problems over the UK's land border with Ireland when in order to preserve the common travel area between the two countries, the previous government had to propose formal border checks on flights and ferries between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK.
47. Because it was intended that the scheme should apply to travel within the EU it seems that the European Commission soon found itself involved in the controversy. They ruled late last year that passengers within the EU could not be forced to give advance details and any such scheme within EU borders would have to operate on a voluntary basis. The previous UK Government did not believe its scheme breached EU law and was determined to press ahead. It is understood that talks with the EC were in progress.
48. The other problem is securing the cooperation of travel operators. The same Sky News item referred to above quoted the *Chamber of Shipping* (which represents the ferry companies who carry more than 20 million passengers in and out of UK ports each year) as saying the current system would cause enormous disruption for ferry passengers: "The e-Borders system as the Government has proposed it offers the nasty prospect of extra hassle and extra cost to passengers, for no benefit whatsoever." Of the

programme for implementation the Chamber said: "There's no prospect at all of that happening within the timescale that the Government has suggested. They have suggested that it will happen by the end of this year. It won't."

49. It remains to be seen what the new government will do.

Laptop Computers

50. Current EU law requires that all laptops should be removed from bags at airport screening points. But for 18 months the UK - with permission from the EU – carried out a limited technology trial at two airports – Heathrow and Glasgow - where laptops were permitted to remain in bags at screening points. This was made possible by sophisticated scanners which could see deep inside a bag or briefcase. According to British Airways the trial was well received by passengers.

51. The trial came to an end in February 2009 passengers at Heathrow and Glasgow are now required to comply with the current EU regulations and present large electrical items such as laptops outside of their cabin bags before screening.

52. Last year we reported that the results were being evaluated. The Department of Transport were asked in April about the results of the evaluation but thus far nothing has been heard.

Lifting the Restrictions on Liquids

53. Where a passenger needs certain liquids during the flight, he or she can take them into the cabin in limited quantities as follows:

- containers must hold no more than 100ml
- containers must be carried in a single, transparent, re-sealable plastic bag, which holds no more than a litre and measures approximately 20cm x 20cm
- contents must fit comfortably inside the bag so it can be sealed
- the bag must not be knotted or tied at the top
- each passenger can carry only one of these bags
- the bag must be presented for examination at the airport security point

54. Containers larger than 100ml (excluding essential medicines) are not allowed through the security point even if they are only part full.

55. These restrictions on liquids in hand baggage still give rise to huge confusion among passengers and large quantities of these fluids are confiscated at airports every day.

56. But an end is in sight. Regulation (EC) 300/2008, which took full effect on 29th April 2010, sets a clear deadline for the lifting of the current restrictions on the carriage of liquids in cabin baggage – new screening equipment for liquids must be in use at all airports across Europe by April 2013.

Charges for Security Services

57. Last year we reported that Liverpool, Bristol, Luton and Leeds Bradford have introduced a charge where a passenger pays a charge to by-pass the ordinary security queues by using a special fast track security facility.

58. This is trend which seems to have taken root. According to a press report in April 2010 Newcastle Airport has introduced a new paid fast track security lane, to help passengers who are short of time pass through security more quickly. The fast-track security passes, which cost £3, can be purchased from two kiosks in the terminal, near the security search area.

59. It seems likely that similar arrangements have been introduced at other airports and it may be of interest to the meeting if delegates representing the consultative committees at other airports were to come to the meeting briefed on practice at their own airports.

60. Similarly delegates may like to brief themselves on whether charges are made for other security facilities including, as for example at Manchester Airport, where passengers need a clear plastic bag for permitted liquids.

Common Rules across Europe

61. Members will recall that as long ago as September 2005 the European Commission said it proposed to strengthen the common air security rules and indeed it published a new draft Regulation which would replace the rules imposed in 2002.

62. The new Regulation was finally approved as Regulation (EC) 300/2008⁶ which took full effect on 29th April 2010. According to the Commission it is the aim of the new rules to improve, streamline and simplify existing procedures. Its press release⁷ says

- eliminating duplication of security controls. For example, reducing costly duplication of checks in strictly controlled areas of EU airports, where there has already been strict screening for access. This is of significant operational benefit for airlines and airports.
- simplifying procedures. For example, by establishing a single set of standards for the documents you need to get access at airports. The new rules clarify which kinds of identification and authorisations are necessary for access to different restricted areas. This clarifies the situation for authorities making it easier for them to operate the system.
- harmonising procedures. For example, introducing EU-wide procedures for the recognition of hauliers transporting air cargo consignments. These can be recognised and used by hauliers in all Member States – this reduces restrictions for hauliers and the need for costly re-screening of cargo.
- introducing common minimum standards as regards security training for all staff that implement security controls.

63. The new framework allows for the recognition of equivalence of security measures of third countries, which can open the door to the establishment of one-stop security arrangements between the EU and non-EU countries. One benefit of such a one-stop security system is that passengers arriving at EU airports and transferring to other destinations would no longer need to be re-screened, thus allowing for faster connection times, lower costs and greater convenience for travellers. It is not known if the UK has yet entered any arrangements of this kind.

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May 2010

⁶ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:097:0072:0084:EN:PDF>

⁷ <http://www.ukacccs.info/ecpressreleaseip-10-479.pdf>

ANNEX A1

DfT Consultation on the use of Body Scanners - Executive summary

1. This consultation paper invites responses from stakeholders on the Government's interim code of practice for the acceptable use of advanced imaging technology (also known as body scanners, or hereafter as security scanners) in an aviation security environment. A copy of the interim code of practice is addressed at Annex A.
2. The interim code of practice was published to support the implementation of security scanners at Heathrow and Manchester as part of a package of measures in response to the attempted attack on Northwest flight 253 to Detroit on Christmas Day 2009.
3. Security scanners provide an additional layer of security that will help airport security staff to detect a variety of items that could potentially be used to launch a terrorist attack on an aircraft. Security scanners help airport security staff to detect a wider range of items that could be used to threaten the security of an aircraft, air passengers or crew. While no technology can be 100% effective, we believe that the additional assistance security scanners provide means it makes sense to deploy them swiftly.
4. Where security scanners are required to be deployed, airport operators must ensure that the measures in the interim code of practice (the Code) are followed. It provides for specific measures in relation to the following issues:
 - Privacy
 - Data protection
 - Health and safety
 - Equipment approval
 - Training
 - Communications
 - Selection criteria
 - Protocols
5. On 1 February the Government committed itself to consulting on the interim code of practice with a view to producing a final code to underpin a further rollout of security scanners across the UK. This document fulfils that commitment.
6. The purpose of the code is to ensure that the use of security scanners is proportionate and in accordance with the law and that passengers are treated sensitively and with respect.
7. The code of practice will be enforced by the Department for Transport's aviation security compliance Inspectors.

ANNEX A2

DfT Reply on efficacy of body scanners

The introduction of security scanners at UK airports is one of several additional measures designed to enhance existing security at UK airports as announced in a joint statement between the Secretary of State and the Home Secretary on Jan 5:

<http://www.dft.gov.uk/press/speechesstatements/statements/aviationbordersecurity>

We are consulting on the interim code of practice for the use of these machines as outlined in the Secretary of State's statement of 1st Feb:

<http://www.dft.gov.uk/press/speechesstatements/statements/adonis20100201>

We have published further background information here:

<http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgf/security/aviation/airport/securityscanners/information/>

As stated in the consultation paper: Security scanners provide an additional layer of security that will help airport security staff to detect a variety of items that could potentially be used to launch a terrorist attack on an aircraft. Security scanners help airport security staff to detect a wider range of items that could be used to threaten the security of an aircraft, air passengers or crew. While no technology can be 100% effective, we believe that the additional assistance security scanners provide means it makes sense to deploy them swiftly.

We are consulting on the interim code of practice to ensure that the use of security scanners is proportionate and that passengers are treated sensitively and with respect.

ANNEX B
House of Commons – Home Affairs Committee
Report “Counter Terrorism Measures at British Airports”
- Conclusions and recommendations

1. The wider introduction of full-body scanners is a welcome development in airport security. We look forward to improvements in technology which will allow more effective and quicker scanners and urge the Government to work closely with industry in developing and introducing newer, improved models that would be more than 60% effective. We also recommend that the Government place greater emphasis on varying the measures put in place rather than relying on a mass deployment of one make and model. Passengers, and terrorists, should not know what regime they will face when they arrive at airports; greater unpredictability and a higher level of deterrence is needed in airport security arrangements. (Paragraph 10)
2. The institution of “proportionate” measures, as described by Paul Clark strikes us as a euphemism for adopting a wholly reactive stance and waiting for terrorists to demonstrate their new capabilities before implementing improved security measures. In view of the ongoing terrorist threat to airline passengers and staff we urge the Government to constantly look for further technological measures to improve airport security. This should be matter of the utmost priority for the Ministers concerned. (Paragraph 11)
3. If done correctly, profiling is clearly a powerful tool against terrorism—the earlier and more precisely that a threat can be identified, the easier the security operation will be; terrorist activity does not make a distinction between people of different origins, faiths or nationality. While we therefore cautiously recommend the use of profiling, we note that its use is also fraught with danger, as we have also noted in our Report into The Cocaine Trade, targeted security should not be perceived to be undertaken on crude racial or ethnic grounds. The code of practice announced by Lord Adonis on 1 February is therefore welcome. The Government should now take steps to publicise its existence and ensure that airport staff adhere to the guidelines. In addition to the requirement in the draft code of practice that security officers must have completed appropriate training, the Government, should also mandate universal Behaviour Assessment and Security Screening (BASS) training, or similar, for all airport security staff at all UK airports, not just those operated by BAA, as a condition of employment. (Paragraph 16)
4. Given the importance of explosive trace detection (ETD) equipment, particularly in conjunction with the introduction of “profiling”, we do not understand why its introduction on a wider scale is not required before 31 December 2010. We still have not received a satisfactory answer as to why there is such a discrepancy in deadlines between the introduction of body scanners and trace detection equipment. We recommend that the Government speed up the deployment of ETD equipment and inform us why wider deployment will take up to 12 months. (Paragraph 19)
5. While we appreciate that certain technical measures on the implementation of the proposed lists have yet to be decided, we are surprised that the Government is unable to share some relatively basic information on how the new system will operate. For example, it is disappointing that the Government cannot estimate, even to a low degree

of accuracy, how large such lists are intended to be. Pending the results of the Home Office implementation review, we will not comment on the effectiveness of the “watchlist” measures except to suggest that this review should be completed as soon as possible and the results shared with the Committee. While we await this information we note the statement from Colonel Richard Kemp, a security expert, on the general effectiveness of watchlists: “These things are important but are only as good as the intelligence that feeds into them and only as good as the conscientiousness with which the information is spread around the place”.(Paragraph 21)

6. International standards in aviation security must be made tougher and the Government must push for tighter measures both in the EU and IACO, while reserving the right to unilaterally refuse direct flights from countries which are unwilling to agree tougher standards and encouraging IACO to be more willing to impose sanctions where needed. Rather than merely negotiating a reasonable outcome with the country concerned, the Government should be more willing to refuse direct flights, which in turn would create a commercial incentive for all states to improve their security regime. Help, both financial and technical, should be provided to help all willing states unable to reach the higher baseline. During this inquiry we have heard that a full-body scanner costs in the region of £100,000, it is clear that the funding allocated to the CTRF could therefore provide much in the way of equipment and training. (Paragraph 26)
7. More must be done to tackle terrorism at the source; it will not be enough merely to improve security at British airports. Despite the work done by the Department of Transport overseas it is clear that weak points exist in global airport security and the security regime in some countries, through a combination of a lack of resources and training, will be relatively lax. The British Government should do more, more quickly to improve airport security across the globe, particularly in identified “hotspots” of terrorist activity. We therefore welcome the funding allocated through the CTRF and urge the Government to ensure a much greater provision of direct help in the form of body scanners, ETD equipment and training to vulnerable areas.(Paragraph 27)
8. Having witnessed these full-body scanners working at first-hand, we are confident that the privacy concerns that have been expressed in relation to these devices are overstated and that full body scanners are no more an invasion of privacy than manual “pat-downs” or searches of bags. Air passengers already tolerate a large invasion of their privacy and we do not feel that full body scanners add greatly to this situation. Privacy concerns should not prevent the deployment of scanners.(Paragraph 30)
9. Colonel Richard Kemp, an acknowledged expert in security matters, was correct to place great importance on the human aspect of security measures and, while we would not advocate the Government unilaterally mandating tougher measures and regulations without the cooperation of the industry, we are concerned that Lord Adonis’ letter of 19 February suggests a somewhat laissez-faire attitude on the part of the Government towards the matter of airport security staff. (Paragraph 35)
10. The fact that the deployment of staff is an “operational decision” should not prevent the Government from imposing improved security measures where it deems them necessary. In particular, the Government should work more closely with airport operators and security contractors to ensure adequate deployment of female security staff at security checkpoints and to develop and institute an universal improved training regime for all security staff deployed at all UK airports. (Paragraph 36)
11. The Government is correct not to publicise every measure that it is taking, but should do more to camouflage and hide the technical specifications of security equipment. An initial step that the Government should take would be to insist that, as far as possible, the outside of security equipment is standardised and its technical specifications hidden from passengers. (Paragraph 38)
12. The threat of terrorist attacks against airports and airplanes, as we noted earlier, is very real and ongoing. We therefore welcome the steps announced in the aftermath of the attempted attack of 25 December and urge the Government to speed up the roll-out of body scanners, and, particularly, Explosive Trace Detection equipment. We are

confident that both of these devices and the other announced measures will form a better, “multi-layered” security regime. (Paragraph 39)

13. Airport security should not be viewed as something which occurs purely once a passenger steps into an airport terminal, but should begin the moment that a ticket is booked. In this context, the demarcation between transport security (“Transec”) based in the Department for Transport and wider counter-terrorism activity, centred in the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism, based in the Home Office is unhelpful. We do not understand why transport security remains institutionally separate from wider counter-terrorism work and intelligence-gathering, and we cannot see the benefits of this separation of responsibility. Close collaboration between Government departments is a poor substitute for centralising policy and control under one roof. We recommend that Transec becomes the responsibility of the Home Office under the auspices of the OSCT. (Paragraph 40)